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INTRODUCTION
When courts seek to determine a website user’s privacy expectations and
the website’s promises to that user, they almost invariably look to the terms
of use agreement or to the privacy policy.1 Courts rarely look to the
* Assistant Professor, Cumberland School of Law at Samford University; Affiliate
Junior Scholar, Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law School. The author would
like to thank Daniel Solove, William McGeveran, Chris Hoofnagle, Ryan Calo, Cathy
Packer, Anne Klinefelter, Nancy Kim, Jen King, Fred Stutzman, Dean Smith, Jennifer
Hartzog, Danielle Citron, Marcia Hofmann, Will DeVries, Lauren Willis, Jennifer Urban,
Deven Desai, the Cumberland School of Law faculty, the participants of the Third Annual
Privacy Law Scholars Conference, and the participants of Samuelson Law, Technology &
Public Policy Clinic’s Privacy Scholars Speakers Series.
1. E.g., McVicker v. King, 266 F.R.D. 92, 95–96 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (looking to the
privacy policy and terms of service to find that a blog created an expectation of privacy for
its users); Sedersten v. Taylor, No. 09-3031-CV-S-GAF, 2009 WL 4802567, at *1, *3
(W.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009) (finding a website privacy policy does not waive a user’s right to
anonymous free speech); In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299,
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privacy settings or other elements of a website where users specify their
privacy preferences because these settings and elements are typically not
considered part of any contract or promise to the user.2 Yet studies have
shown that few users actually read or rely upon terms of service or privacy
policies.3 In contrast, users regularly take advantage of and rely upon
privacy settings.4
Consider Facebook. The social networking site has a Terms of Use
Agreement with a section titled “privacy.”5 The agreement references
Facebook’s privacy policy, a separate document.6 Many users, however,
do not rely on these documents when establishing the privacy they expect
when using Facebook.7 When a user sets up a Facebook profile, the user
can set a series of privacy settings that allow the user to control how widely
accessible the profile is.8 The user’s profile can be viewed by friends
only—those people explicitly invited to see the profile—or by “friends of

325 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (examining an airline’s privacy policy to determine whether plaintiffs
had a claim for reliance); Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D.
2004) (finding that plaintiffs failed to allege that they read, understood or relied upon the
privacy policy and thus failed to allege contractual damages); In re Nw. Airlines Privacy
Litig., No. 04-126(PAM/JSM), 2004 WL 1278459, at *6 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004) (holding
that the privacy statement did not constitute a unilateral contract and that plaintiff must have
read the policy to rely on it).
2. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing courts’ treatment of privacy settings and elements
in determining the existence of a contract); see also infra Part II.A.4 (proposing the use of
website design as a contract and discussing the accompanying issues).
3. TABREEZ GOVANI & HARRIET PASHLEY, STUDENT AWARENESS OF THE PRIVACY
IMPLICATIONS WHEN USING FACEBOOK pt. 5.3 (2005), http://lorrie.cranor.org/courses/fa05/
tubzhlp.pdf (finding that 80% of the users surveyed for the study had not read the Facebook
Privacy Policy); Andy Greenberg, Who Reads the Fine Print Online? Less Than One
Person in 1000, FORBES (Apr. 8 2010, 3:15 PM), http://blogs.forbes.com/firewall/
2010/04/08/who-reads-the-fine-print-online-less-than-one-person-in-1000/ (noting that
studies have found that only 0.11% of users will view a site’s terms of service by clicking
on a link).
4. MARY MADDEN & AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, REPUTATION
MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL MEDIA: HOW PEOPLE MONITOR THEIR IDENTITY AND SEARCH
FOR OTHERS ONLINE 2 (2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/ReputationManagement.aspx (finding that “71% of social networking users ages 18–29 have changed
the privacy settings on their profile to limit what they share with others online”).
5. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/
terms.php?ref=pf (last revised Apr. 26, 2011) (stating, in the first term of the agreement, that
“[y]our privacy is very important to us” and referring users to the website privacy policy).
6. See id. (directing users to click a link to view the privacy policy); Facebook’s
Privacy Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last revised Dec. 22,
2010) (informing users of how the website uses and shares users’ information, along with
extensive other terms).
7. See JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., THE FTC AND CONSUMER PRIVACY IN THE COMING
DECADE 2, 12 (FTC Tech-ade Workshop 2006), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/
FTC_Consumer_Privacy.pdf (finding that only 1.4% of study participants reported reading
the terms of standard-form electronic agreements often and thoroughly, 66.2% rarely read or
browse these agreements, and 7.7% stated that they have never noticed or read them).
8. See Controlling How You Share, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/privacy/
Explanation (last visited Aug. 9, 2011) (enabling users to control, via customization, the
accessibility of their Facebook profile).
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friends,” which expands the exposure much further, to anyone linked to the
user’s friends.9 If the user wants to expose personal information to all
Facebook users, the profile can be set to be public.10 The user can also
specify whether the profile appears in Internet search results.11
Figure 1:
Screenshot of Facebook’s Privacy Settings (June 2011)

These settings, more than the vague, verbose, and often unread terms of
service and privacy policy, are usually determinative of a user’s privacy

9. See id. (describing the different sharing options, including sharing information with
“Everyone,” “Friends of Friends,” and “Friends Only”).
10. See id. (noting that the information that users do not protect, meaning
“[i]nformation available to everyone,” is viewable by anyone on the Internet). The fact that
a profile is “public” can have significant legal consequences. See Moreno v. Hanford
Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 861 (Ct. App. 2009) (noting that “once posted on
myspace.com,” Moreno’s posting was “available to anyone with internet access”). In
Moreno, the court held that a woman who posted a poem to her public profile on the social
network site MySpace had no reasonable expectation of privacy because she “publicized her
opinions . . . [on] a hugely popular internet site. [Moreno’s] affirmative act made her article
available to any person with a computer and thus opened it to the public eye.” Id. at 862.
11. See Controlling How You Share, supra note 8 (noting that the “[p]ublic search”
option “controls whether things [users have] specifically chosen to share with everyone
show up in searches” on the Internet).
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expectations when using Facebook. A user relies on these settings.12
Indeed, without the ability to set a profile to be viewable only by friends, a
user might not sign up to use Facebook at all, or would reveal far less
intimate information in the online profile.13 Should the privacy settings be
considered part of the agreement between the user and Facebook? In an
age where website interactivity is the hallmark of many sites, courts must
re-think what constitutes an online agreement.
This Article proposes that website features and design should, in some
contexts, be considered enforceable promises. Code-based negotiations for
confidentiality can form implied-in-fact contracts or give rise to a claim for
promissory estoppel.14 The so-called “Web 2.0”15 has provided individuals
with a greater ability to negotiate terms regarding their own privacy by
accepting offers to delete personal information, remove identifying tags,
and use privacy settings—online activities that clearly indicate a user’s
desire to control the flow of her personal information.16 Yet courts often
fail to recognize these code-based promises, instead considering them little
more than luxuries offered by websites.17 This is the case even though
these features are often couched in a contractual setting.18
Doctors, lawyers, financial professionals, priests, and even intimate
partners regularly make implicit promises to respect the privacy of others
based upon the context of their relationship.19 Yet on the Web, courts seem
12. See Complaint at 2, 12, Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00366-RSL
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 2, 2011) (describing users’ use of privacy settings, and alleging that
Amazon circumvented the settings established by users); Complaint at 2, 7, Ferguson v.
Classmates Online, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-00365-RAJ (W.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 2010) (alleging a
claim for, among others, breach of contract for failing to keep confidential information
protected by privacy settings).
13. See, e.g., MADDEN & SMITH, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that the majority of social
network site users have utilized privacy settings to limit what they share online).
14. See, e.g., McVicker v. King, 266 F.R.D. 92, 96 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (finding that “the
terms of service of the blog create an expectation of privacy for any registered user”);
Complaint at 23–24, Del Vecchio, No. 2:2011-cv-00366-RSL (alleging that Amazon’s
privacy policy and privacy notice constituted promises to users that their privacy settings
would function as users’ expected).
15. See Tim O’Reilly, What Is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the
Next
Generation
of
Software, O’REILLY
NETWORK
(Sept.
30,
2005),
http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html (describing the meaning of the term
“Web 2.0”).
16. See Controlling How You Share, supra note 8 (noting that Facebook users can
control what parts of their profile and corresponding information are viewable, and to
whom).
17. See, e.g., Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D. 2004)
(looking only to the privacy policy itself, as opposed to code-based promises, to determine
whether a breach of contract related to privacy had occurred); see also infra Part II.A.1
(describing types of “code-based promises,” such as padlock images on websites).
18. See Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and “Blurry-Edged” Social Networks,
50 B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1341 (2009) (noting that even where websites “create the illusion of
limited publication and control,” there is no way for users to utilize that control nor is there
any law that recognizes those user decisions); Controlling How You Share, supra note 8.
19. See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship
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to recognize only boilerplate terms of use when analyzing contractual
agreements.20 The central thesis of this Article is that by primarily relying
on standard-form terms to analyze online agreements, courts risk ignoring
the full agreement between the parties. This approach has inhibited
contract-based solutions to protect the flow of personal information. The
advent of highly interactive website design compels a re-examination of the
contractual relationship between websites and their users. No area is in
greater need of increased scrutiny than user privacy.
This Article introduces a new theory into contract doctrine and the
surprisingly-neglected intersection of online agreements and
confidentiality. This Article contains three proposals to refocus the law
away from standard-form doctrine to an approach that more accurately
reflects the agreements between websites and users. First, to the extent
website design is incorporated into, or is consistent with, a website’s terms
of use, or to the extent website design induces reliance, courts should
consider these design features enforceable promises. Second, courts should
expand their analysis of unconscionability to include consideration of
malicious interfaces that manipulate, exploit, or attack users in areas of a
website beyond the terms of use. Third, website design should be seen as a
subsequent agreement, or “operational reality,” between the parties. This
Article concludes by proposing that a more nuanced analysis of online
agreements is necessary when highly interactive websites implicate an
individual’s privacy. While online agreements can threaten an individual’s
privacy, the extension of contract doctrine to website design represents an
opportunity for users to regain at least some control over the flow of
personal information.
I.

CHOKING ON FORM CONTRACTS

Courts often ignore website design and interactive features as implicit
and explicit aspects of the agreement between the website and the user.
This is a significant omission, since the only other contractual terms on
virtually every website are standard-form.21 This section will review the
doctrine surrounding online contracts and caution against ignoring much of
Privacy Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 913 (2006)
(observing that “[c]onfidential relationships are recognized by the law in a variety of
contexts, including familial, friendship, and business relationships” and that each
relationship contains an “implicit promise of confidentiality” characterized by reasonable
expectations, customs, and reliance).
20. See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffery J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV 429, 434 (2002) (stating that the principal legal issue in
interpreting both paper and virtual contracts is the effect that should be given to boilerplate
terms).
21. See id. at 429 (recognizing the proliferation of boilerplate language in agreements
on websites).

HARTZOG.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1640

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/10/2011 3:04 PM

[Vol. 60:1635

the website-user relationship by relying solely on the text in terms of use
and privacy policies.
A primary function of the Internet is connecting people. These
connections can create a privity of contract between websites and users.22
Contracts between websites and users are typically found in the form of
terms of use.23 With online agreements on a number of websites, the 74%
of Americans online each day24 may enter into dozens of contracts that
impact the flow of their personal information. These agreements are
adjudicated under standard-form contract doctrine because they are
perceived as non-negotiable.25 This means users are regularly bound by
terms they did not read or understand—a common critique of all standardform contracts.26
Much, if not all, online communication falls within the ambit of a
website’s terms of use or privacy policy. Behavioral restrictions regulate
users’ interactions with other users. Privacy policies dictate how personal
information and browsing activity will be stored and used.27 Terms of use
disclaim liability for a large swath of website activity and inaccuracies.28
These terms are purportedly contracts; moreover, these contracts are found
on virtually every website on the Internet.29
Before the Internet, most standard-form contracts, which were largely
adhesive in nature, were typically used in high-volume consumer sales
transactions.30 These contracts enabled mass commerce because they
22. Privity is defined as “[t]he connection or relationship between two parties, each
having a legally recognized interest in the same subject matter.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1320 (9th ed. 2009).
23. See Molnar v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., No. CV 08-0542 CAS (JCx), 2008 WL
4772125, at *2, *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008) (looking to a website’s “Terms of Use” to find
a contract between the defendant website and the plaintiff, a website user).
24. 74%—America
Online,
PEW
INTERNET
&
AM.
LIFE
PROJECT,
http://pewresearch.org/databank/dailynumber/?NumberID=948 (last visited June 3, 2011).
25. See Burcham v. Expedia, Inc., No. 4:07cv1963 CDP, 2009 WL 586513, at *2 (E.D.
Mo. Mar. 6, 2009) (providing that “[a] customer on notice of contract terms available on the
internet is bound by those terms,” just as with any binding contract).
26. Id.; see also Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1179 (1983) (noting that with contracts of adhesion, such as
standard-form contracts, “the adhering party is in practice unlikely to have read the standard
terms before signing the document and is unlikely to have understood them if he has read
them”).
27. See, e.g., Facebook’s Privacy Policy, supra note 6.
28. See Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 460 (2006) (indicating
that terms of use “control (or purport to control) the circumstances under which buyers of
software or visitors to a public Web site can make use of that software or site”).
29. See, e.g., David Mirchin, Terms of Use: The Rules Have Changed, INFO. TODAY,
Oct. 2007, at 1 (“Virtually every commercial and noncommercial Web site has Web site
‘Terms and Conditions,’ or Terms of Use.”).
30. See NANCY S. KIM, ‘WRAP CONTRACTS AND PRIVACY 1 (Association for the
Advancement of Artificial Intelligence Press Technical Report SS-10-05, 2010), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1580111 (observing that “as mass
market sales became possible with industrialization, so did mass consumer form contracts”
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managed risk well and lowered the cost of transactions.31 Websites created
a new venue for standard-form contracts in the form of terms of use. Site
administrators use them to limit liability through traditional means—such
as arbitration clauses and disclaimers of warranties—while maximizing the
benefit of user participation by restricting user behaviors and remedies and
requiring a relinquishment of rights, including certain privacy and
intellectual property interests.32 As websites became ubiquitous, so did
terms of use. As a result, an overwhelming amount of online activity is not
governed by default law but rather through agreement between the
parties.33
The omnipresence of standard-form contracts can be troubling.
According to the great scholar Friedrich Kessler, standard-form contracts
allow businesses “to legislate in a substantially authoritarian manner
without using the appearance of authoritarian forms.”34 Kessler found that
this power “enabl[es] [businesses] to impose a new feudal order of their
own making upon a vast host of vassals.”35 This “orgy of contract
formation”36 has significant consequences for information privacy. To
properly frame the contractual significance of code-based promises in
privacy disputes, a brief review of online contract doctrine is in order.

because it was generally easier “to create standard terms for standard business transactions”
where communication with individual customers was impracticable).
31. See Rakoff, supra note 26, at 1230 (noting that contracts of adhesion, such as
standard-form contracts, create cost savings and lower prices that result from placing the
risk on the consumer or adherent).
32. JOSEPH BONNEAU & SÖREN PREIBUSCH, THE PRIVACY JUNGLE: ON THE MARKET FOR
DATA PROTECTION IN SOCIAL NETWORKS 24 (The Eighth Workshop on the Economics of
Information Society 2009), http://preibusch.de/publications/Bonneau_Preibusch__Privacy_
Jungle__2009-05-26.pdf (concluding that the authors’ study of various website privacy
policies revealed “few meaningful rights [were] assigned to users,” while website operators
“reserved many data collection and sharing rights for themselves”); Sandra Braman &
Stephanie Roberts, Advantage ISP: Terms of Service as Media Law, 5 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y
422, 438 (2003) (discussing the ways that Internet Service Providers limit their own
liability, while also infringing on user rights).
33. See Braman & Roberts, supra note 32, at 423 (noting that subscribers or users of
Internet Service Providers do so on the basis of a contractual agreement with the provider).
34. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943).
35. Id.
36. This phrase was borrowed from Guido Calabresi in his 1982 book Common Law for
the Age of Statutes. Calabresi stated, “The last fifty to eighty years have seen a fundamental
change in American law. In this time we have gone from a legal system dominated by the
common law, divined by courts, to one in which statutes, enacted by legislatures, have
become the primary source of law.” GUIDO CALABRESI, COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES 1 (1982). Calabresi himself borrowed the phrase from Grant Gilmore when he
argued that this “orgy of statute making” had significant consequences for American
jurisprudence. The current “Age of Contracts” similarly threatens to alter the dominant
form of law governing individuals online.
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A. A Brief Review of “Wraps”
It has become a truism that virtually no one reads standard-form online
agreements. A recent study found that less than one in 1000 e-commerce
website users read the terms of use.37 Even Supreme Court Chief Justice
John Roberts has admitted he does not read the fine print on websites.38
Yet these agreements are routinely enforced, although not without great
debate.39
Online standard-form contracts are typically categorized as “clickwrap”
or “browsewrap” agreements, although that distinction can be blurred at
times.40 A clickwrap agreement requires some kind of affirmative act like
the click of a mouse on a button indicating an assent prior to accessing a
website.41 Browsewrap agreements dictate that additional browsing past
the homepage constitutes acceptance of the contract.42 Terms of use
agreements, which often incorporate privacy policies, are types of
clickwrap and browsewrap agreements.
These agreements contain many standard terms, such as arbitration
clauses, damage limitations, and warranty disclaimers.43 Increasingly,
terms of use also include consent to spyware clauses,44 vague behavioral
restrictions,45 and severe limitations on the use of content from the
website.46
37. YANNIS BAKOS ET AL., DOES ANYONE READ THE FINE PRINT? TESTING A LAW AND
ECONOMICS APPROACH TO STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS 2 (NYU Center for Law,
Economics and Organization, Law & Economics Research Paper Series, Working Paper 0940, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443256; see also Greenberg, supra note 3.
38. Debra Cassens Weiss, Chief Justice Roberts Admits He Doesn’t Read the Computer
Fine Print, ABA JOURNAL LAW NEWS NOW (Oct 20, 2010, 7:17 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chief_justice_roberts_admits_he_doesnt_read_the_
computer_fine_print/. Chief Justice Roberts also stated that standard-form agreements were
a problem without a clear answer. Id.
39. See, e.g., Nancy S. Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797, 800 n.10
(2007) (citing Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability
and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1993)); Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals,
Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1307, 1311 (2005).
40. See, e.g., Hotels.com v. Canales, 195 S.W.3d 147, 155 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006)
(resolving that the user agreement on the Hotels.com website could not “neatly be
characterized as either a ‘click-wrap’ or ‘browse-wrap’ agreement”).
41. See Kim, supra note 39, at 799.
42. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 429 (2d Cir. 2004); Specht v.
Netscape Comm. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 22 n.4 (2d Cir. 2002) (describing “click-wrap”
agreements); Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981–82 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
43. Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard Form
Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 229
(2007).
44. Wayne R. Barnes, Rethinking Spyware: Questioning the Propriety of Contractual
Consent to Online Surveillance, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1545, 1547 (2006) (articulating that
consumers often agree to have spyware loaded onto their computers without realizing it).
45. See, e.g., Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 5 (“You will not post
content or take any action on Facebook that infringes or violates someone else’s rights.”).
46. See, e.g., Terms of Use, VOICE OF SAN DIEGO (Jan. 25, 2005),
http://www.voiceofsandiego.org/terms_of_use/ (asserting that users cannot “reuse, republish
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The parties’ state of mind during the formation of these agreements is
irrelevant. Rather, courts consider what the parties objectively conveyed to
each other in what is known as “the objective theory of contract.”47 Only
external acts and manifestations, not subjective, internal intentions,
determine mutual assent to a contract.48 When a website contains the
phrase, “we respect your privacy,” it does not matter what the website
intended.49 The question is what a reasonable person in the user’s position
would have understood from that communication.50 Thus, online, courts
should consider the entire user experience to adequately understand the
average user.
Although courts analyze online contracts according to traditional
principles of contract law, two special problems arise in the context of
online agreements: requirements of noticeable presentation of offers and
formations of assent. Both problems arise due to the unique features of
websites. In interpreting online contracts, courts “focus on whether the
plaintiff had reasonable notice of and manifested assent to the online
agreement.”51 Specifically regarding browsewrap agreements, courts have
held that whether these agreements are valid depends on the website user’s
“actual or constructive knowledge” of the terms and conditions employed
by the site, prior to using it.52 Thus, to be bound, parties need not have an
actual “meeting of the minds.”53 Rather, a reasonable communication of
the terms will suffice.54
The reasonable communication requirement is a combination “of
reasonable notice of the contractual nature of the offered terms and the
opportunity to review those terms,” which serves as a “proxy for the
offeree’s clear manifestation of assent.”55 A reasonable communication of
or otherwise distribute the content or any modified or altered versions of it, whether over the
Internet or otherwise, and whether or not for payment,” without the written permission of
the website or a third-party copyright holder).
47. Moringiello, supra note 39, at 1311.
48. Wayne Barnes, The Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119, 1119–
20 (2008).
49. See id. at 1120 (noting that “contract formation depends on what is communicated,
not what is merely thought”).
50. Id. at 1125.
51. Burcham v. Expedia, Inc., No. 4:07CV1963 CDP, 2009 WL 586513, at *2 (E.D.
Mo. Mar. 6, 2009) (citing Specht v. Netscape Comm. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28–30 (2d Cir.
2002); Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007)).
52. Id. at *3 n.5 (citations omitted).
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 cmt. c (1981) (noting that
although the element of agreement in contracts is also known as the “meeting of the minds,”
“it is clear that a mental reservation of a party to a bargain does not impair the obligation he
purports to undertake”).
54. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 429 (2d Cir. 2004)
(detailing that by using Register.com’s Internet product, the end user received both “notice
and presentation of the proposed terms”).
55. Moringiello, supra note 39, at 1314.
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terms gives rise to what is commonly referred to as the offeree’s “duty to
read.”56 In other words, if the terms of a contract are reasonably
communicated, the offeree cannot be absolved from liability for failing to
read them because the offeree had a legal duty to do so.57
The notice requirement is fulfilled differently for clickwrap agreements
and browsewrap agreements.58 While notice for clickwrap agreements can
be satisfied by using code to prohibit a user from proceeding without first
having the opportunity to review the contract, notice in browsewrap
agreements “is given through the conspicuous display of the contract.”59
Assent to a contract is typically manifested in the process of offer and
acceptance,60 both of which are demonstrated by “an outward manifestation
of intent to be bound.”61 By manifesting intent to be bound by a contract,
adherents assume the duty to read.62 The practical result of this duty is that
individuals who objectively agreed to be bound by contract will be deemed
to have agreed to all terms contained in the writing, regardless of whether
they read the terms or understood them.63
Courts appear to have reached a loose consensus in applying standardform doctrine to online agreements. Courts tend to enforce clickwrap
agreements that require an action on the part of the user, but they tend to
shy away from enforcing browsewrap agreements that require no outward
manifestation of asset.64
Courts oscillate on “notice sentence
browsewraps,” which provide users with a link to terms of use but do not
require users to acknowledge that they have seen them.65
Thus, standard-form contract doctrine on the Web, while controversial,
is relatively stable. Courts relying on this doctrine give great weight to the
specific language of the terms, often with little regard to other
56. Id.
57. See id. at 1314–15 (observing that courts will typically enforce standard-form
contracts so long as the user has notice of the terms, subject to limited exceptions, such as
unconscionability).
58. Ian Rambarran & Robert Hunt, Are Browse-Wrap Agreements All They Are
Wrapped Up To Be?, 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 173, 176 (2007).
59. Id.
60. Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using “Knowing
Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 475 (2008).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 476.
63. Id.
64. Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Mutually Assured Protection: Toward Development of
Relational Internet Data Security and Privacy Contracting Norms, in SECURING PRIVACY IN
THE INTERNET AGE 78–79 (Anupam Chander et al. eds., 2008); see also Juliet M.
Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, Survey of the Law of Cyberspace: Electronic
Contracting Cases 2007–2008, 64 BUS. LAW. 199, 218 (2008) (“After some early forays
into a separate set of legal principles for electronic transactions, it is now clear that common
law rules fit them well.”).
65. Matwyshyn, supra note 64, at 79.
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understandings and representations that arise within relationships.66 These
terms have great significance for user privacy, but they do not always
reflect the complete understanding between the parties. Professor Mark
Lemley criticized online terms of use, stating “more and more courts and
commentators seem willing to accept the idea that if a business writes a
document and calls it a contract, courts will enforce it as a contract even if
no one agrees to it.”67
B. The Danger of Over-Reliance on Standard-Form Contracts
Courts that solely rely on standard-form contracts threaten user privacy
by ignoring other elements of the contractual relationship between the
website and user. Of the many ways that standard-form contracts threaten
privacy, this section will address liability shields created by a standardform contract, the problem of presumed consent, and standard-form
contracts superseding the weak existing legislation on the issue.
Fundamentally, contracts exist to bind parties to promises by creating
legal obligations.68 On a website, these promises can be made in nearly
any form and can appear anywhere. Promises made as part of a negotiation
can be more attractive for users; negotiation is typically deliberative, thus
negotiated terms are presumably understood and satisfactory to contract
adherents. The same cannot regularly be said for terms in standard-form
contracts.
Scholars writing about intellectual property, alternative dispute
resolution, and limitations on liability have all observed the impact of
standard-form contracts.69 Those areas typically have a standard “default”
position in the absence of contractual provisions.70 If a website’s terms of
use fail to grant the appropriate licenses, then implied licenses will exist to
govern the use of intellectual property, and the parties will retain their
rights.71 If a contract fails to include an arbitration clause, then courts are
the default arbiter of disputes. Similarly, the Uniform Commercial Code

66. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 1 (noting that courts look to the language of the
privacy policy to determine whether the right to privacy was waived).
67. Lemley, supra note 28, at 459.
68. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.1, at 4 (1999); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (defining a contract as “a promise or a set of promises
for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in
some way recognizes as a duty”).
69. See Barnes, supra note 44, at 1547–48; Lemley, supra note 28, at 459–62.
70. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps In Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) (postulating that default
rules serve as gap-fillers in contracts that are incomplete); Robert E. Scott, A Relational
Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 598 (1990)
(describing the debate regarding default rules).
71. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 28, at 477.
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(UCC) provides guidance for warranties and disclaimers.72 Yet, the law
regarding the default status of self-disclosed information online is
inconsistent and unpredictable.73 Thus, for good or bad, contracts that
address privacy issues provide a degree of clarity.74
Duties of confidentiality may also extend to websites when they promise
to protect users. These promises can often be found in a website’s privacy
policy. Privacy policies explain how a website will use a visitor’s personal
information.75 While privacy policies, standing alone, are seen as
unenforceable statements of policy, many websites incorporate the policy
into their terms of use so that it binds users.76 According to Professor
Allyson Haynes, although privacy policies typically include “a slew of
terms both relating to privacy . . . and relating to other rights of the
consumer,”77 many prominent court decisions addressing breach of contract
claims arising from privacy policies have not enforced the privacy policy
against the website owner.78
According to Haynes, such binding policies can actually provide a
liability shield for companies looking to take advantage of users’ failure to

72. See U.C.C. § 2–313 (1999) (describing the creation of express warranties); see also
Warkentine, supra note 60, at 526.
73. See Woodrow Hartzog, Promises and Privacy: Promissory Estoppel and
Confidential Disclosure in Online Communities, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 891, 891 (2009) (voicing
that traditional remedies usually fail in online privacy claims); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A
Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 921 (2005) (discussing how
different states can have drastically different takes on individual privacy protection for
information on social networks).
74. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Privacy As Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1125, 1127 (2000) (citing PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS:
WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 8
(1998)). Swire and Litan took notice of this leverage, stating:
Consider the incentives of a company that acquires private information. The
company gains the full benefit of using the information in its own marketing efforts
or in the fee it receives when it sells the information to third parties. The company,
however, does not suffer losses from the disclosure of private information.
Because customers often will not learn of the overdisclosure, they may not be able
to discipline the company effectively . . . . It can be daunting for an individual
consumer to bargain with a distant Internet merchant . . . about the desired level of
privacy.
Id.
75. Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control Over
Personal Information?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 587, 594 (2007).
76. Id. at 596.
77. Id. at 597.
78. See, e.g., In re Jet Blue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 316–17
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (examining an airline’s privacy policy to determine whether plaintiffs had
a claim for reliance); Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D.
2004) (finding that plaintiffs failed to allege that they read, understood or relied upon the
privacy policy and thus failed to allege contractual damages); In re Nw. Airlines Privacy
Litig., No. Civ. 04-126(PAM/JSM), 2004 WL 1278459, at *6 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004)
(finding that the privacy statement did not constitute a unilateral contract and that plaintiff
must have read the policy to rely on it).
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read by selling or sharing users’ personal information.79 The policies
essentially allow websites to track and exploit user information.80 Even
users who attempt to educate themselves about websites’ privacy policies
often do not fully understand the policies and the powers they give
websites regarding the use of personal information. Professor Nancy Kim
observed that websites may respond to customer ignorance or inaction by
inserting increasingly more aggressive and intrusive terms in “‘wrap
contracts.”81 A number of lawsuits have been filed by website users
claiming breach of contract and promissory estoppel resulting from a
website’s violation of its privacy policy, with mixed results.82
Applying a strict standard-form contract analysis, a number of courts
have denied any meaningful recovery for a website breaking promises it
made in a privacy policy.83 As will be discussed in Part II, by focusing
solely on language in the terms, courts are excluding aspects of the
relationship between the user and the website that could aid in the
interpretation of vague terms in the policy or give rise to additional implied
promises of confidentiality.84
Another danger of standard-form contracts, and one of their most
powerful uses, is obtaining user consent.85 This consent is often relied
upon by websites when they deploy “spyware”—software that collects and
transmits personal information and is often surreptitiously downloaded

79. Haynes, supra note 75, at 588.
80. KIM, supra note 30, at 1.
81. Id.
82. E.g., Complaint at 18–19, Strickland-Saffold v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., No. CV10-723512 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 7, 2010), dismissed by plaintiffs, Notice of Dismissal
with Prejudice Under Rule 41(A)(1)(a) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure (Dec. 30,
2010); cf. McVicker v. King, 266 F.R.D. 92, 97 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (denying motion to compel
a website’s anonymous users’ identities); Sedersten v. Taylor, No. 09-3031-CV-S-GAF,
2009 WL 4802567, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009) (denying motion to compel anonymous
poster’s identity from a news website).
83. See, e.g., In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d at 327
(holding that the plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation to be compensated for their
personal information and therefore could not sustain their breach of contract claim); Dyer,
334 F. Supp. 2d at 1200 (finding that plaintiffs failed to allege that they read, understood, or
relied upon the privacy policy and failed to allege contractual damages); In re Nw. Airlines
Privacy Litig., 2004 WL 1278459, at *6 (finding that the privacy statement did not
constitute a unilateral contract and that plaintiff must have read the policy to rely on it).
84. See also McClurg, supra note 19, at 888 (discussing the threat to intimate
relationships posed by the Internet and lack of enforcement of the public disclosure tort);
Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 156–58 (2007) (arguing that the breach of confidentiality
tort has been limited, not reaching its potential).
85. Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technoconsen(t)sus, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 529, 548 (2007)
(“The legal nexus of digital consent is contract law. For many bodies of law, the technology
revolution has added a complicating factor to the legal equation; in contract law, the uneasy
peace of doctrine around form contracts/contracts of adhesion has been permanently
disrupted.”).
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onto an individual’s computer.86 According to Professor Wayne Barnes,
consumer assent to spyware installation is rarely debated, but in truth “the
privacy implications of spyware are profound.”87 Individuals typically
receive some modest benefit, such as software that entertains or offers a
service, and as consideration, the user agrees to let the program install
spyware.88
Central to the issue of consent is the possible failure of the users to
adequately understand the consequences of their consent—or to recognize
that they are consenting to anything at all.89 The significance of an
individual’s contractual consent stretches beyond the actions and remedies
in contracts and into statutes, common law, and even constitutional law.90
But consent can also frustrate a user’s claim for breach of contract. By
looking only at the terms providing for consent to the collection and use of
information,91 courts potentially exclude elements important for valid
consent. For example, did the website promise to respect a user’s privacy
preferences? If so, has the user revoked consent to the collection or use of
certain pieces of information by expressing those preferences?
Additionally, was the website designed in such a way as to frustrate or
corrupt consent to the proposed terms?
Because online agreements are typically drafted to protect the website,
they often have a negative effect on a website user’s privacy.92 Most
privacy disputes involving online agreements look to the “consensual”
aspect of the agreement.93 Judges have struggled to support the privacy
interests of individuals when those individuals have consented to
surveillance, collection, or use of their information.94

86. Barnes, supra note 44, at 1545.
87. Id. at 1547.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 1595, 1597 (explaining that hardly any users bother to read or fully
understand privacy agreements).
90. See generally Matwyshyn, supra note 85, at 531–32 (introducing the legal “noise”
created by crossing legal disciplines). Matwyshyn proposed a “reasonable digital consumer”
standard of consent created through empirical research instead of the current standard,
which is something of a legal fiction.
91. See infra note 98 (highlighting cases where courts have looked to the terms of use
in their decisions).
92. BONNEAU & PREIBUSCH, supra note 32, at 24 (explaining that privacy policies often
reserve the right for websites to collect user data, such as IP addresses, while giving few
meaningful rights to users); Barnes, supra note 44, at 1545 (noting that online agreements
often include provisions in which users “consent” to have spyware placed on their
computers); Woodrow Hartzog, The New Price to Play: Are Passive Online Media Users
Bound by Terms of Use?, 15 COMM. L. & POL’Y 405, 414 (2010) (asserting that users often
have little understanding of what they are agreeing to because online agreements are
typically long and filled with legalese).
93. Cf. Barnes, supra note 44, at 1571 (noting that virtually all existing or proposed
laws applicable to spyware contain an element of consent).
94. See infra notes 98–99.
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Courts vary in requiring that an individual have read a contract to
effectuate consent, depending on the kind of legal challenge.95 In Fourth
Amendment disputes, most courts seem to hold users to their “duty to
read.”96 Yet the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has, in at least one
dispute, held that, despite manifesting objective consent to be bound by an
agreement, a website’s failure to present terms that impact an individual’s
privacy clearly and conspicuously constituted an unfair and deceptive trade
practice.97
However, many courts have typically found that terms of use can dispel
an expectation of privacy regardless of whether the user actually read the
terms.98 Terms of use can also be used as evidence to destroy a user’s
anonymity.99 Jonathan Sobel, Karen Petrulakis, and Denelle Dixon-Thayer
have noted that the failure to enact an all-encompassing statutory regime to
protect privacy has resulted in Congress turning to the contractual
“concepts of notice, opt-out, and information access to protect privacy
rights.”100 Contracts can also grant consent for activity otherwise
prohibited by statute, such as government surveillance.101 Ultimately, this
patchwork of legislation reveals that standard-form contracts serve as the
catalyst for a great deal of statutory provisions that can affect a user’s
95. See supra note 78 (identifying cases where courts looked to whether the plaintiffs
had read the agreements entered into).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Hart, No. 08-109-C, 2009 WL 2552347, at *18 (W.D. Ky.
Aug. 17, 2009) (finding the plaintiff’s expectation of privacy destroyed by the terms of
Yahoo!’s privacy policy); Lukowski v. County of Seneca, No. 08-CV-6098, 2009 WL
467075, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2009) (noting that while users may have a subjective
expectation of privacy, the terms of the service agreement are relevant to determine the
objective expectation of privacy).
97. See Complaint at 5, In re Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4264
(F.T.C. Aug. 31, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823099/index.shtm.
98. See, e.g., Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 526–27 (6th Cir. 2008)
(discussing the various forms of terms and the resulting change in expectations of privacy);
Hart, 2009 WL 2552347, at *18 (finding the plaintiff’s expectation of privacy destroyed by
the terms of Yahoo!’s privacy policy); Lukowski, 2009 WL 467075, at *10 (noting the
importance of terms in a subscriber agreement in determining the expectation of privacy).
99. See Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 566–67 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (holding there was only a minimal expectation of privacy under the ISP’s terms of
service).
100. Jonathan K. Sobel et. al., The Evolution of Data Protection as a Privacy Concern,
and the Contract Law Dynamics Underlying It, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE
55, 57 (Anupam Chander et al. eds., 2008).
101. See, e.g., Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act to Control Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites, 63
MD. L. REV. 320, 322 (2004) (explaining how websites protect non-copyrightable data
through the terms agreed to by users to access the websites); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, It’s
Nobody’s Business, But You Still Cannot Lie About It: Criminalizing Innocent Attempts to
Maintain Cyber-privacy, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 377, 382–83 (2004) (discussing the
implications of lying about one’s identity after consenting to terms to obtain access under
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act); Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting
“Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1596
(2003) (explaining how breach of contract may now criminalize contract law on the
Internet).
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privacy. As a result, there has never been a greater need for enhanced
scrutiny of online agreements.
II. THE CONTRACTUAL SIGNIFICANCE OF WEBSITE DESIGN
Courts should no longer ignore the contractual significance of website
design. Standing alone, interactive features of a website might be little
more than bells and whistles. However, many websites make user privacy
and, by extension, user privacy settings, a central feature of the user’s
experience and a prominent part of the terms of use. Because websites that
employ these features are in a contractual relationship with their users,
website design should be part of an online agreement when it is
incorporated into or consistent with the terms of use.
Contracts were a part of everyday life long before the Internet, but they
were largely formed in the commercial or transactional contexts—not in
the contexts of social interaction and media consumption.102 After all,
when one turns on the television, listens to the radio, or reads a newspaper,
contractual relationships are not formed. Every time one picks up the
phone or gossips in the hallway, no one presents long and confusing terms
dictating what kinds of communications are acceptable. Yet virtually every
time individuals access a website, they are asked to agree to a cadre of
terms against which their only recourse has been simply to close their
browser or go to a different website.
As our experience online grows richer, our relationships with websites
and other website users become more nuanced. Courts should better
consider these nuances and the context in which information is disclosed
when interpreting online agreements. This section explores the underanalyzed elements of online agreements that exist outside of websites’
explicit terms of use and privacy policies. Recognition of these elements—
code-based promises, malicious interfaces, and the operational reality of
the contracting parties—could reduce the schism between contracts as a
source of, and solution for, privacy problems online.
The threats to privacy posed by online agreements are created by the
same problem inherent in employing contracts as a solution to regulate
privacy: lack of meaningful choice.103 Professor Jerry Kang recognized
102. See generally Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between
Contract and Intellectual Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827, 832 (1998)
(recognizing that the underlying purpose of contracts is to conduct commerce and
transactions).
103. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 105–06 (2004) (arguing that providing people with opt-out rights
and privacy policies does not give those people control); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death
of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1464, 1502 (2000) (stating that total secrecy is
impractical today and expecting individuals to contract for confidentiality is unrealistic);
Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1229
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this hurdle, stating “[t]he strongest challenge to the market solution [to
privacy harms] is that ‘consent’ is coerced and not truly voluntary in the
marketplace.”104 This coercion essentially forces users to relinquish control
of their personal information, even when they would rather not.105
Although website users can reject the contract wholesale, the choice
becomes meaningless when services, important information, and social
networks are only available on a single website. For example, Facebook
users cannot re-create their network on a different social network website
without convincing the other Facebook users to leave as well.
That a pure standard-form contracts approach to protecting privacy
leaves little opportunity for meaningful choice does not mean that the
contractual approach to protecting privacy should be abandoned. Rather, a
more nuanced contractual approach that provides users with the ability to
tailor the contract to suit them could be beneficial.106 Such flexibility
affords users a meaningful choice.107 Indeed, Professor Pamela Samuelson
stated that contracts as a legal tool provide flexibility to “accommodate the
multiple interests people have in personal information, the contextual
nature of determinations about the appropriateness of collection or use of
personal data, the significance of consent as a factor in determining
appropriate uses, and the evolutionary nature of social understanding about
information privacy.”108 On the Internet, individuals can exercise a higher
degree of control over personal data.109
Before this level of control may be exercised, however, new practices
must be put into place.110 According to Professor Matwyshyn, the “new
legal construction should be inherently relational; it should create
confluence of interests in data security between content providers and users
and better reflect the commercial value of user data.”111
While consent to the use of personal information is regularly found in
terms of use via an omnibus or blanket level of assent to all terms,112 it
typically remains a legal fiction. Most individuals simply do not read the

(1998) (explaining how user information can be tracked with detail as standard elements of
browsing the Internet); William McGeveran, Note, Programmed Privacy Promises: P3P
and Web Privacy Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1812, 1818–20 (2001) (noting the ease in which
personal data can be collected on the Internet because of its characteristics).
104. Kang, supra note 103, at 1265.
105. Id.
106. See Steven A. Bibas, Annual I.H.S.–Eberhard Student Writing Competition Winner,
A Contractual Approach to Data Privacy, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 591, 609 (1994).
107. Id.
108. Samuelson, supra note 74, at 1172.
109. Id.
110. Matwyshyn, supra note 64, at 74.
111. Id.
112. See supra notes 23, 25.
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terms,113 and even if they did, most individuals have difficulty fully
comprehending what they actually agreed to and the risk they inherited by
that consent.114 Broad, sweeping agreements that control the use of
personal information lack the specificity to be truly effective in providing
meaningful control over the flow of personal information because users
often disclose both sensitive and innocuous personal information on the
same website.
Privacy-related agreements could be much more effective on a microlevel. Smaller, discrete agreements for confidentiality regarding specific
pieces of information could be more effective than one all-encompassing
agreement regarding the protection of personal information. Because
individuals do not consider all information they disclose to be uniformly
public or private, it is not surprising that contracts forcing them to do just
that are of limited effectiveness.115 This Article offers three related
suggestions for the analysis of online agreements. These proposals are not
advocating extreme modifications to established rules of contract formation
and interpretation.
Rather, they are suggestions for a magnified
examination of the true relationship between websites and users.
First, courts should broaden their consideration of what constitutes a
promise by better recognizing when websites have clearly offered to keep
information confidential through website design, icons, or features.116 For
example, in some contexts, features such as privacy settings or icons such
as padlocks could reasonably be perceived as offers by the website to
protect certain pieces of information. Second, courts should better
recognize the role that malicious website interfaces play in invalidating true
agreements between the parties.117 Features such as misleading links,
disabled back buttons, unnecessary and confusing forms, and pop-ups
covering desired content could all frustrate contract formation. Third, if
113. See JOSHUA GOMEZ ET AL., KNOWPRIVACY 11 (2009), available at
http://knowprivacy.org/report/KnowPrivacy_Final_Report.pdf (stating that privacy policies
are not usually read, in part, because users cannot understand them); Lee Goldman,
Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 171, 192
(2003) (believing that consumers will not read disclosures or form agreements but will
simply sign where told to sign); Rakoff, supra note 26, at 1179 (finding a near universal
scholarly and empirical consensus that consumers do not read contracts prior to signing
them); Sobel, supra note 100, at 66 (noting that contract law is an imperfect tool because
most contracts are not usually read); Warkentine, supra note 60, at 469 (introducing the
article with the statement that standard-form contracts are rarely read by their signers).
114. See Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form
Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 121 (2007) (finding that consumers are unlikely to give the
terms the full meaning and importance they deserve).
115. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 125–26 (2010) (arguing against what she refers to as the
“public/private” dichotomy).
116. See infra Part II.A.
117. See infra Part II.B.
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online agreements are offered as evidence in privacy disputes, courts
should not limit their analysis to the explicit terms of use. Instead, courts
should consider the “operational realities” outside of the terms of use that
induced reliance on a promise of confidentiality, such as whether other
parts of the website either contradicted the terms or filled in ambiguous
terms.118
A. Design as Promise
A promise does not have to be in words to be binding.119 A promise can
be any “manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a
specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a
commitment has been made.”120 Promises as part of an otherwise valid
contract or one detrimentally relied upon can be enforced by law.121
It is puzzling that courts have focused almost entirely on the language in
terms of use and privacy policies when analyzing online agreements.
Those terms are not the only reasonably perceived promises in a website.
In some contexts, website code—page design, icons, or features—can
reasonably be perceived as an offer or promise by the website to protect
certain pieces of information.
1.

Privacy indicators
A growing body of literature in the field of human-computer interaction
has focused on what are known as “privacy indicators”—designs such as
logos, icons, settings, and seals used to intuitively convey a website’s
policy regarding collection and use of personal information.122 For
118. See infra Part II.C.
119. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981) (“A promise may be stated in
words either oral or written, or may be inferred wholly or partly from conduct.”); id. § 19(1)
(“The manifestation of assent may be made wholly or partly by written or spoken words or
by other acts or by failure to act.”); see also McClurg, supra note 19, at 912–13 (stating
promises can be inferred from conduct).
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981).
121. See id. §§ 2(1), 90(1) (outlining that a promise may be a manifestation of intention,
such as a provision in a contract or which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance).
122. See SERGE EGELMAN ET AL., STUDYING THE IMPACT OF PRIVACY INFORMATION ON
ONLINE PURCHASE DECISIONS 1 (2006) (describing P3P privacy policies and the use of
Privacy Finder to identify websites with privacy settings matching a user’s preferences);
SERGE EGELMAN ET AL., TIMING IS EVERYTHING? THE EFFECTS OF TIMING AND PLACEMENT
OF ONLINE PRIVACY INDICATORS 1 (2009) (observing that consumers took into account
privacy indicators, when available, when purchasing from websites); JULIA GIDEON ET AL.,
POWER STRIPS, PROPHYLACTICS, AND PRIVACY, OH MY! 1 (2006) (finding that privacy policy
comparison information had an impact on non-privacy-sensitive purchases but more
influence on privacy-sensitive purchases); JANICE TSAI ET AL., SYMBOLS OF PRIVACY 2
(2006) (concluding that even ambiguously defined privacy symbols made users more
comfortable with doing business with a website); Lorrie Faith Cranor, What Do They
“Indicate?” Evaluating Security and Privacy Indicators, INTERACTIONS, May–June 2006,
at 45 (noting the disappointing effectiveness of privacy indicators because of the ease in
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example, padlock icons located in the bottom right corner of web browsers
often indicate the presence of a secure sockets layer (SSL) connection
between the browser and a website.123 Similar padlock icons are used on
Facebook to indicate that certain settings have been adjusted to restrict
access to, or otherwise protect, information.124 A number of websites
employ “privacy seals” like TRUSTe to assure users of the website’s
responsible privacy practices.125 Amazon.com allows users to create a
public profile and “private wish lists.” Amazon reinforces the confidential
nature of these private lists by encouraging users to also create lists that
friends can see.126 Twitter provides that only followers approved by the
user will receive a user’s tweets when giving users the option to protect
their disclosures.127 (Is Twitter representing that they will not share these
protected disclosures with any other parties? After all, Twitter did not
include “protected tweets” when they gave the Library of Congress every
tweet from every public account for archival.128)
These indicators are designed to improve consumer confidence and
instill consumer trust in a website’s privacy practices.129 Researchers like
Victoria Groom, M. Ryan Calo, and Alessandro Acquisiti have found that
many of these icons can elicit a visceral response from website users.130
Calo has observed how anthropomorphic features in code can affect a
user’s perception of website privacy because “[h]uman-computer interfaces

fooling humans). A full explication of code-based promises is outside the scope of this
Article but will be addressed in future research.
123. Cranor, supra note 122, at 45.
124. Help Center, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/home.php#!/help/?ref=pf (last
visited Aug. 9, 2011) (representing the “Safety Center” link with a padlock).
125. EGELMAN ET AL., TIMING IS EVERYTHING? THE EFFECTS OF TIMING AND PLACEMENT
OF ONLINE PRIVACY INDICATORS, supra note 122, at 2.
126. Making Your Wish List Searchable, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/
help/customer/display.html?nodeId=501094 (last visited Aug. 9, 2011); Your Account,
AMAZON.COM, https://www.amazon.com/gp/css/homepage.html?ie=UTF8&ref_=topnav_ya
(last visited May 21, 2011).
127. Account Settings, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/settings/account (last visited Aug. 9,
2011).
128. See Benny Evangelista, Tweets Preserved for All Time Under Library of Congress
Deal,
SFGATE,
Apr.
16,
2010,
http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-0416/business/20851780_1_tweets-biz-stone-library (“The only exceptions are tweets from a
small percentage of protected accounts.”).
129. EGELMAN ET AL., TIMING IS EVERYTHING? THE EFFECTS OF TIMING AND PLACEMENT
OF ONLINE PRIVACY INDICATORS, supra note 122, at 2; TSAI ET AL., supra note 122, at 1.
130. See VICTORIA GROOM & M. RYAN CALO, USER EXPERIENCE AS A FORM OF PRIVACY
NOTICE: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY (forthcoming 2011) (on file with author); M. Ryan Calo,
Against Notice Skepticism, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1790144 (fearing that most adults who
see the terms “privacy policy” assume the website safeguards information, regardless of the
website’s actual practice); Leslie K. John, Alessandro Acquisti & George Lowenstein,
Strangers on a Plane: Context-Dependent Willingness to Divulge Sensitive Information, 37
J. OF CONSUMER RES. 858, 868 (2011) (finding that privacy concern was incommensurate
with the objective dangers of disclosure).
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that introduce an apparent person at the site of collection may resolve the
notice [of a privacy threat] problem in a direct and more salient way:
through a visceral reminder that the data being collected will be used and
Judges should better recognize that users exposed to
shared.”131
anthropomorphic features are generally more receptive to the information
conveyed and, thus, might internalize that information better than fine-print
legalese.
Regardless of accuracy, many users believe that websites with privacy
indicators have adopted consumer-friendly practices.132 A team of
researchers from the Annenberg Public Policy Center and the Samuelson
Law, Technology, and Public Policy Clinic found in a 2006 study that
when users see the term “privacy policy” on a website, “they assume that a
web site will not share their personal information.”133
This research demonstrates that users can perceive (or misperceive)
website features, short phrases, icons, and other privacy indicators as
representative of a website’s privacy promises. In some contexts, these
representations should become part of an online agreement. To the extent a
website promises in language or in code to respect a user’s preferences for
privacy, user actions such as deleting information and adjusting privacy
settings could be considered acceptances of offers to protect information.
Because users are constrained by code (they generally cannot effectively
negotiate with a website using words), the online interaction takes on
additional significance. Instead of simply meaning “I wish to delete this
information,” user activity could mean “I wish to protect this information,
so I am accepting your offer to take it down and keep it confidential.”
2.

Working with the fine print
By failing to recognize code-based promises, courts risk ignoring the
many ways that contracts can be formed digitally. Recognition of codebased acceptances, such as use of privacy settings, could also fulfill the
desired “modicum of bilaterality” capable of defeating some claims of
unconscionability.134 In light of online communication, many courts are
already beginning to deviate from the old theoretical framework135 and
131. M. Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to Privacy and
Technology Scholarship, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 809, 849 (2010); see also Calo, Against
Notice Skepticism, supra note 130.
132. EGELMAN ET AL., TIMING IS EVERYTHING? THE EFFECTS OF TIMING AND PLACEMENT
OF ONLINE PRIVACY INDICATORS, supra note 122, at 2.
133. TUROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 2.
134. Cf. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing that the
“modicum of bilaterality” required in arbitration agreements).
135. Amelia Rawls, Comment, Contract Formation in an Internet Age, 10 COLUM. SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 200, 219 (2009) (discussing that businesses are using new technologies to
avoid liability and courts have begun to distance themselves from old theoretical
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“have endorsed the view that while ‘some contracts are formed and their
terms fully defined at a single point in time, many transactions involve a
rolling or layered process.’”136 This more nuanced analysis of contract
formation could recognize a privacy policy or terms of use as one layer and
code-based promises as additional layers of the agreement.
No matter how many layers are perceived, an offer must be included for
a contract to be formed. The great contracts scholar Arthur Corbin defined
an offer as “an act whereby one person confers upon another the power to
create contractual relations between them.”137 Under this Article’s
proposal, the option provided by the website in code could be interpreted
by the courts as an offer to keep information confidential. As discussed
previously, the objective theory of contracts holds that it is not the
subjective intent of the website that dictates the parties’ obligations but
rather what the expression of intent objectively conveys to the other
party.138 Corbin stated, “[w]hat kind of act creates a power of acceptance
and is therefore an offer? It must be an expression of will or intention. It
must be an act that leads the offeree reasonably to believe that a power to
create a contract is conferred upon him.”139
This objective expression of intent for website design to be part of a
contract can be found in a website’s terms of use and privacy policy.
Terms of use and privacy policies often explicitly address ways a user can
affect a website’s collection and use of personal information. For example,
Facebook’s terms of use agreement limits the scope of the license granted
to the website according to the user’s privacy and application settings.140
By incorporating references to the ability to alter personal information in an
online agreement, these websites invite acceptance of offers of
confidentiality. An offer to keep deleted or protected information
confidential need not be explicit to form a contract so long as such a
manifestation of intent was otherwise conveyed.141
frameworks).
136. Id. (citing Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software
Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000)).
137. Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations,
26 YALE L.J. 169, 181 (1917). Corbin goes on to state that “the act of the offeror operates to
create in the offeree a power . . . ; thereafter the voluntary act of the offeree alone will
operate to create the new relations called a contract.” Id. at 181–82.
138. See Barnes, supra note 48, at 1120 (explaining that, under the modern objective
theory, manifestations of intent should be viewed from the point of view of a reasonable
person as the other party).
139. Corbin, supra note 137, at 182.
140. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 5 (outlining what permissions a
user gives to Facebook in relation to the type of content the user provides).
141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981) (“An offer is the
manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in
understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.”).

HARTZOG.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

WEBSITE DESIGN AS CONTRACT

8/10/2011 3:04 PM

1657

Many privacy policies, such as the one provided by The New York
Times,142 are given contractual effect through incorporation into the
website’s terms of use.143 The New York Times privacy policy, which is
part of the website’s terms of use agreement, promises not to “share
personal information about you as an individual to third parties without
your consent.”144 Following that clause, under the heading “Your Privacy
Choices,” the agreement informs users “[t]o view and edit your personal
information, please visit the appropriate part of any of our Web sites.”145
By offering “privacy choices” and promising to disclose only that
information consented to by the user, The New York Times effectively
promises to protect information designated as private by the user.
Promises can come in many forms on a website, but the fine print of
privacy policies or terms of use and privacy settings have different effects
on users. Users who read or even scan privacy policies are more judicious
regarding the disclosure of information,146 while users who utilize privacy
settings tend to disclose more information than users who did not.147
Researchers Fred Stutzman, Robert Capra, and Jamila Thompson have
found that both privacy policy consumption and privacy behaviors, such as
the utilization of privacy settings, were significant factors affecting
disclosure on a social media site. Because privacy policies and code-based
features such as privacy settings are intertwined, courts should not ignore
these code-based features in their contractual analysis.
Some terms of use explicitly offer to protect the privacy of deleted or
protected information. In its terms of use, Myspace promises protection to
users who take advantage of privacy protection features, providing:
After you remove your Content from the Myspace Services we will
cease distribution as soon as practicable, and at such time when
distribution ceases, the license will terminate. If after we have
distributed your Content outside of the Myspace Services, you change
the Content’s privacy setting to “private,” we will cease distribution of
such “private” Content outside of the Myspace Services as soon as
practicable after you make the change.148

Facebook has also given contractual authority to a user’s privacy settings

142. Privacy Policy Highlights, THE NEW YORK TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/
content/help/rights/privacy/highlights/privacy-highlights.html (last updated Apr. 18, 2011).
143. Terms of Service, THE NEW YORK TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/content/help/
rights/terms/terms-of-service.html (last updated Mar. 16, 2011).
144. Privacy Policy Highlights, supra note 142.
145. Id.
146. FRED STUTZMAN ET AL., FACTORS MEDIATING DISCLOSURE IN SOCIAL NETWORK
SITES 14 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
147. Id. at 14–18.
148. Terms & Conditions, MYSPACE.COM, June 25, 2009, http://www.myspace.com/
help/terms.
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in its statement of rights and responsibilities, stating in the terms of use that
“[y]ou own all of the content and information you post on Facebook, and
you can control how it is shared through your privacy and application
settings” and that “[w]e require applications to respect your privacy.”149
This language could be interpreted to create a contractual obligation to
respect a user’s privacy preference because it has become a significant
aspect of the contract between the user and the website.
Two recent complaints demonstrate how Internet users might perceive
indirect privacy settings as promises. The complaint in Ferguson v.
Classmates.com expresses a user’s reliance on a website’s promise of
confidentiality via privacy settings, terms of use, and privacy policies.150
This complaint, filed as a class action, asserted that Classmates.com, a
school-based social network site, deceptively manipulated users’ privacy
settings to expose previously “private” profiles in an attempt to generate
business.151 Referring to the ability to protect information through privacy
settings and statements made by the website, the complaint alleged that
“[t]he promise of confidentiality and the ability of Classmates through
various protections to deter unwanted intrusions and harassment have been
important to Classmates’ ability to attract and retain Users.”152 In the claim
for, among other things,153 breach of contract, the complaint asserts,
“Before the recent events described in this Complaint, Classmates’ policies
did not allow the dissemination of Users’ personal information to the
general public, through undescribed ‘Applications,’ or otherwise. The
privacy provisions in place when Users subscribed constitute material
contractual terms by which Classmates was bound, and remains bound.”154
The inference of contractual obligation arising from promises to respect
149. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 5. Facebook’s terms of use
agreement contains numerous references to the ability to control who sees your information
via privacy settings:
[S]ubject to your privacy and application settings: you grant us a non-exclusive,
transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP content
that you post on or in connection with Facebook (“IP License”). . . . You can use
your privacy settings to limit how your name and profile picture may be associated
with commercial, sponsored, or related content (such as a brand you like) served or
enhanced by us. You give us permission to use your name and profile picture in
connection with that content, subject to the limits you place.
Id. Yet, arguably, the default for some of the settings is contrary to the spirit of these terms.
For example, the “Wall Photos” album is, by default, viewable by everyone. Who Can See
My “Wall Photos” Album?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=20139 (last
visited June 3, 2011).
150. Class Action Complaint at 2, 4, Ferguson v. Classmates Online, Inc., No. 2:10-cv00365-RAJ (W.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 2010).
151. Id. at 3.
152. Id. at 7.
153. The complaint also asserts claims under the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, the Washington Consumer Protection Act, and unjust enrichment. Id. at 13–17.
154. Id. at 15–16.
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user preferences of privacy lies at the heart of this Article’s proposal.
In Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com, Inc.,155 the plaintiffs claimed relief under
a theory of, among other things, promissory estoppel for promises to
respect privacy settings.156 The plaintiffs alleged that Amazon.com ignored
users’ Web-browser privacy settings to fraudulently collect personal
information without permission and share it with other companies.157
Essentially, the plaintiffs asserted they were tricked into believing the site
emphasized privacy protection, when in reality the available privacy
settings were useless.158 The users asserted they “reasonably relied upon
Amazon’s promise to refrain from using cookies to collect PII and share
PII with third parties without the user’s consent and thereby caused
Plaintiffs . . . to choose to visit and make purchases on Amazon’s
websites.”159
Some courts have already enforced vague promises of privacy in terms
of use and privacy policies. In McVicker v. King,160 for example, the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
denied a request to compel the disclosure of records that could identify
seven anonymous message-board commentators.161 The plaintiff asserted
that the terms of use were too ambiguous to create an expectation of
privacy because they did not explicitly provide that the identity of the user
would be protected.162
The court disagreed, finding instead that the terms of service listed for
the blog gave the registered users an expectation of privacy.163 The terms

155. Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00366-RSL (W.D. Wash. Mar. 2,
2011).
156. Complaint at 23–24, Del Vecchio, No. 2:11-cv-00366-RSL.
157. Nick Eaton, Suit: Amazon Fraudulently Collects, Shares Users’ Personal Info,
SEATTLEPI.COM (Mar. 2, 2011, 10:00 PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/business/article/SuitAmazon-fraudulently-collects-shares-users-1040886.php#ixzz1JEgjzVWO.
158. Id.
159. Complaint at 23–24, Del Vecchio, No. 2:11-cv-00366-RSL.
160. 266 F.R.D. 92 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
161. Id. at 93.
162. Id. at 96. The relevant terms were actually located in the website’s privacy policy,
which was incorporated into the terms of use and stated that the website will use personally
identifiable information
only as permitted by law and [it] may be used to communicate with you about
something you have posted, the community agreement, or privacy policy, products
or services offered by YourSouthhills.com or the Company, administration of
contests, processing e-commerce transactions or other topics the Company believes
you may find interesting. Personally identifiable information collected on the Site
may also be used for other purposes, including, but not limited to, trouble-shooting
and site administration. Certain third parties, our e-mail service provider, for
example, may access the information . . . . The Company may also disclose your
information in response to a court order, at other times when the Company believes
it is reasonably required to do so . . . .
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Id.
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of use stated: “[p]rotecting consumer privacy online is important to us. By
taking steps to protect the privacy of our members, we also hope to
increase members’ confidence in the site and as a result, increase their
online activity.”164 The court found that “[t]he Privacy Policy clearly
reflects that Trib Total Media will disclose its users personally identifiable
information only in very limited situations” and thus gave users an
expectation of privacy.165 Are the general promises made in privacy
policies such as “we will protect your privacy” and “we respect your
privacy settings” any clearer than the impressions conveyed by website
features that allow users to identify the information they want to protect?
This solution can be distilled to a simple proposition: if a website
promises to respect a user’s privacy preferences, then a user’s expression of
privacy preferences through website features like privacy settings should
serve to make the website’s promise binding. While this proposal is
essentially a modified opt-out system, it has several benefits that existing
opt-out systems do not. One benefit is that people who do not have time
“to read through cumbersome documents describing obscure rules for
controlling data”166 can still protect their privacy. This way, unlike the
current opt-out framework that, according to Professor Daniel Solove,
“require[s] individuals to check a box, send a letter, make a telephone call,
or take other proactive steps to indicate their preferences,”167 a website user
would only need to continue using website features to delete or protect
personal information.168
Privacy scholars note that one of the largest problems with a contractual
approach to privacy is the disparity in bargaining power between the
parties.169 They point out that individuals are largely “contract term takers”
in their dealings with organizations170 and that “[p]eople frequently accede
to standardized contract terms without putting up much of a fight.”171
164. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
165. Id.
166. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 160 (1999) (suggesting
the creation of an electronic system to negotiate privacy policy terms).
167. SOLOVE, supra note 103, at 84; see also McGeveran, supra note 103, at 1852–53
(discussing whether opt-in mandates are overly burdensome).
168. Facebook has seen most of its users select some form of privacy protection through
the privacy settings and ability to un-tag or delete personal information offered by the
website. Cf. Ana Muller, Updates on Your New Privacy Tools, THE FACEBOOK BLOG (Dec.
9, 2009, 3:19 PM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=197943902130 (requesting all
350 million users to update their privacy settings). Some websites, like Facebook, already
keep track of this kind of information and would only need to quarantine the information
and refrain from disclosing it. Facebook’s Privacy Policy, supra note 6 (admitting that
Facebook tracks certain actions such as adding connections or creating a photo album).
169. SOLOVE, supra note 103, at 82 (recognizing that when faced with a standard
contract, individuals tend to accede without much debate or negotiation).
170. Id. (citing OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
PERSONAL INFORMATION 9 (1993)).
171. Id. (citing Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815,
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The modified opt-out proposal offers users more meaningful control over
the flow of their personal information notwithstanding standard-form
contracts. The contractual leverage could allow users to be more than a
passive party in the “meeting of the minds.” A reciprocal outcome is not
just desirable from a public policy perspective—it also has legal
significance in states like California that hold a “modicum of bilaterality”
in contracts can help nullify claims of unconscionability.172
3.

The likelihood of reliance
A modified opt-out solution is grounded in the reliance interest in
enforcing contracts. Websites’ promises to protect information should be
enforced if they induced detrimental reliance. Users virtually never read
the terms of use, yet they routinely use privacy settings. Thus, it is likely
that website users will rely on representations made by significant features
of website design more often than boilerplate terms of use. This is
particularly true when terms of use regarding privacy are vague.
One of the maxims of contract law is that ambiguities in contractual
terms should be interpreted against the drafter.173 Websites have the
opportunity to craft terms of use, so this rule reflects an attempt to balance
the inequities between two contractual parties. Websites have complete
control over the ability of users to delete information, utilize privacy
settings, and remove identifying tags. If websites choose to make these
features available and promise to respect user preferences regarding
privacy, should any ambiguities in an online agreement not be interpreted
against the coder?
Regarding contractual protection for privacy, Professor Daniel Solove
notes that:
[i]ndividuals are often presented with an all-or-nothing choice: either
agree to all forms of information collection and use or to none
whatsoever. Such a limited set of choices does not permit individuals to
express their preferences accurately. Individuals frequently desire to
consent to certain uses of their personal information, but they do not
want to relinquish their information for all possible future uses.174

The user-action proposal helps alleviate some of the “omnibus” problem
posed by vague and expansive language in contracts by allowing users to
822–23 (2000)).
172. See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that contractual
terms were unconscionable when they banned class action suits, required
telecommunications customers to submit disputes to arbitration, required the customers to
split the cost of the arbitration, and required confidentiality).
173. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET. AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 600 (6th ed.
2001) (“One of the most time-honored maxims of contract interpretation is that a contract is
to be interpreted contra proferentem (against its author or profferer).”).
174. SOLOVE, supra note 103, at 85.
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determine what information should be protected on a more granular level,
depending on what options are provided by a website.
Ultimately, the user-action proposal simply suggests that courts take a
more granular and contextual approach to contracts regarding privacy
online. By considering the messages conveyed by website design, courts
could recognize the simple micro-agreements and additional promises
governing pieces of information.
4.

The problems with website design as contract
This proposal is not without weaknesses.
Increased website
transparency would be required for the user to realize that an agreement
with the website had been broken.175 Damages for these kinds of privacy
harms are notoriously difficult to recover.176 However, a website’s failure
to adhere to these agreements could be punished by the FTC in the same
manner that the FTC pursues those who fail to abide by their own privacy
policies.177 Additionally, the mere threat of a private cause of action could
help deter reckless practices regarding a website’s disclosure of user
information.
Moreover, some evidence exists that users do not always understand
exactly what information design features, like privacy settings, protect.178
Thus, courts would need to make an additional finding as to what
expectations of confidentiality or privacy were reasonable given the
effectiveness of a particular design element. Such a granular analysis
would have to occur on a case-by-case basis, which could be laborious and
inconsistent. Although it is not always clear what each design feature
protects, evidence that privacy settings are routinely deceiving website
users only further supports the assertion that website design could lead to
detrimental reliance—a hallmark of contract related doctrines such as

175. See generally Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security
Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 916 (2007) (suggesting that federal guidelines for breach
notifications from financial institutions could be used to create a similar system for privacy
breaches); Preston Thomas, Comment, Little Brother’s Big Book: The Case for a Right of
Audit in Private Databases, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 155, 156 (2009) (noting that an
audit system would have to start small and be made in a piecemeal manner).
176. See, e.g., Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D. 2004)
(finding that the plaintiffs failed to allege that they read, understood or relied upon the
privacy policy and failed to allege contractual damages); see also In re JetBlue Airways
Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (failing to find any viable
claims against the defendant in relation to the defendant’s deceptive practices).
177. See, e.g., Cecilia Kang, Google, FTC settle privacy case, WASH. POST, Mar. 31,
2011, at A16 (reporting on a settlement with Google over, among other things, violation of
its own privacy policies).
178. See, e.g., MICHELLE MADEJSKI ET AL., THE FAILURE OF ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORK
PRIVACY SETTINGS 14 (2011), https://mice.cs.columbia.edu/getTechreport.php?techreportID
=1459 (concluding that every study participant had shared unintended information).
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promissory estoppel.179
Websites might become discouraged from offering these features if they
do not want to assume additional contractual obligation. However,
websites need not remove privacy settings altogether. To avoid contractual
obligation, websites should refrain from incorporating the settings into their
terms of use and make clear that the designs, features, and icons should not
be seen as promises by the website to protect information and should,
therefore, be utilized accordingly. While these disclaimers would frustrate
the ability of users to contractually protect their information, they would
also clarify the currently vague promises to respect users’ privacy.
Currently, the fine print of agreements often gives a different impression
than the overall user experience. This is an unjust result.
Websites might also make greater use of merger and integration clauses
in an attempt to limit all contractual agreements to the standard-form terms
of use. Yet the effectiveness of the clauses might be limited because, as
previously discussed, privacy and even privacy settings are often explicit
and operative aspects of the terms of use.180
Courts should look to the specific facts of a dispute to determine what
should be inferred from code and user activity. Ambiguous promises might
be better informed by looking to the code in the same way that other
“offline” ambiguous terms are informed by context.181 In many instances,
interactivity will have no contractual effect. Yet, courts should not ignore
code-based features, such as privacy settings, used to earn a user’s trust
when a website has promised to respect the privacy wishes of its users.
Although the benefit from this proposal might be seen as incremental, it
furthers the same interests sought to be covered by a website’s privacy
policies. It is not burdened with the “omnibus” dilemma whereby one
agreement covers all information, regardless of a user’s preference
regarding specific pieces of personal information.182 Indeed, benefits can
be found even in modest solutions to privacy harms. There may not be one
solution to protecting user privacy, but to echo Professor Michael
Froomkin, “a smorgasbord of creative technical and legal approaches could
make a meaningful stand against what otherwise seems inevitable.”183
179. See, e.g., Hartzog, supra note 73, at 891, 894.
180. See supra Part I.B.
181. See, e.g., Taylor Energy Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 734 F. Supp. 2d 112, 122
(D.D.C. 2010) (“Plaintiff correctly argues that ‘[n]ot all disclosures are created equal;
context matters as to whether a limited disclosure places that information in the public
domain.’”).
182. See, e.g., McGeveran, supra note 103, at 1814 (arguing libertarian versus regulatory
regimes for privacy protection presents a false dichotomy, supporting a multi-modal and
incremental approach).
183. Froomkin, supra note 103, at 1466; see also Thomas, supra note 175, at 156
(“[P]rivacy reform is best approached in small increments that avoid the paralysis
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B. Unconscionable Design
While some website features, such as privacy settings, help users control
the flow of personal information, other website features might frustrate or
confuse users or trick them into disclosing information they did not want to
divulge.184 When considering what parties to a contract “agreed” to, courts
should also consider whether a user’s actions were induced by a malicious
interface. Gregory Conti and Edward Sobiesk, leading researchers on this
form of computer deception, define malicious interfaces simply as those
that “deliberately violate usable design best practices in order to
manipulate, exploit, or attack the user.”185 Malicious interfaces are the
inverse of code-based promises. Whereas code-based promises clarify the
terms of disclosure regarding a user’s information, malicious interfaces
confuse them.
A significant motivation for designers to employ malicious interfaces is
to gather personal information and obfuscate “legally mandated but
undesirable information from the user.”186 Thus, these interfaces are likely
to be involved in privacy and contract disputes. To the extent that a
malicious interface distorted the agreement between a website and a user,
courts should take note of the interference and refuse to give proposed
terms, such as user consent, legal effect.
1.

Procedural unconscionability of website design
In essence, this Article proposes that courts extend the concept of
procedural unconscionability beyond consent to boilerplate terms so as to
also apply it to website design features that can affect the online agreement
between users and websites. The equitable doctrine of procedural
unconscionability was popularized by the UCC but has been expanded in
most states to non-sales contracts.187 Unconscionability is the main tool
used by courts to reject some or all terms in standard-form contracts.188
While “substantive unconscionability” focuses on the substance of the
historically associated with comprehensive reform.”).
184. See, e.g., In re Easysaver Rewards Litig., 737 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1172 (S.D. Cal.
2010) (involving claims by users of an ecommerce website for, among other things, breach
of contract and fraud because the users were allegedly “deceived into authorizing separate
charges to their debit cards simply by typing in their e-mail address for a complimentary
gift”).
185. GREGORY CONTI & EDWARD SOBIESK, MALICIOUS INTERFACE DESIGN: EXPLOITING
THE USER 271 (2010), available at http://www.rumint.org/gregconti/publications/201004_
malchi.pdf (arguing that security and human-computer interaction committees need to come
together to fix deceptive designs).
186. Id.
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981); Russell Korobkin, Bounded
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203,
1256 (2003) (citing Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 145–48 (Ind. 1971)).
188. Korobkin, supra note 187, at 1256.
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actual terms, procedural unconscionability focuses on deficiencies in the
contract formation resulting from lack of knowledge of some or all of the
terms, or lack of voluntariness.189 Lack of knowledge of the terms can be
summarized as “a lack of understanding of the contract terms arising from
inconspicuous print or the use of complex, legalistic language, . . . disparity
in sophistication of parties, . . . and lack of opportunity to study the contract
and inquire about contract terms.” 190 Similarly, involuntary assent to a
contract may exist where parties have unequal bargaining power, nonnegotiable terms exist, and there is a lack of viable options for the weaker
party.191
As others have called for an empirically created “reasonable digital
consumer,”192 this Article echoes the call for empirical analysis of users
and content and proposes that it be extended to the entire user experience.
An analysis of the entire experience is necessary because the agreement
between a user and a website involves more than boilerplate terms, and
thus an examination of unconscionability cannot end at the terms of use.
With respect to privacy, this Article proposes that the significant
presence of malicious interfaces should invalidate consent found in terms
of use to utilize disclosed information. Additionally, personal information
obtained through the use of malicious interfaces should be presumed to be
confidential if a user had an expectation of privacy according to a website’s
terms of use or privacy policy. For example, if Classmates.com promised
to respect its users’ privacy settings yet made the settings intentionally
difficult to use and changed them without notice, the website should be
obligated to keep its promise to its users notwithstanding the consent
obtained via confusing or modified privacy settings.
2.

A taxonomy of malicious interfaces
Courts should consider empirical evidence of user confusion when
confronted with a dispute involving a malicious interface. Common
examples of malicious interfaces include “misleading links, disabled back
buttons, browsers with ‘sponsored’ default bookmarks, unexpected and
unnecessary forms, blinking advertisements, and pop-ups covering desired
content.”193 These malicious interfaces often coerce users into disclosing
189. Bank of Ind., Nat’l Ass’n v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 109 (S.D. Miss. 1979)
(discussing when a contract is unconscionable and finding the contract at issue
unconscionable because it was too one-sided).
190. Id. at 109–10 (citations omitted).
191. Id.
192. Matwyshyn, supra note 85, at 560 (citations omitted).
193. Gregory Conti & Edward Sobiesk, Malicious Interfaces and Personalization’s
Uninviting Future, IEEE SECURITY AND PRIVACY, May–June 2009, at 73,
http://www.rumint.org/gregconti/publications/j3pri.pdf (noting that many individuals are
tricked or coerced into divulging information they do not intend or do not want to divulge).
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private information.194 Indeed, eleven categories of malicious design
techniques have been identified by Conti and Sobiesk: coercion,
confusion, distraction, exploiting errors, forced work, interruption,
manipulating navigation, obfuscation, restricting functionality, shock, and
trick.195 Nearly all these categories could significantly affect the validity of
an agreement between a website and a user.
Several of these malicious interface techniques could invalidate the
assent necessary to form an agreement. For example, coercion, defined as
“[t]hreatening or mandating the user’s compliance,”196 could require a user
to agree to a contract before being allowed to close a screen or otherwise
make use of a computer. Such a tactic would leave no viable alternative to
agreeing to the terms; thus, no voluntary assent would be present. An
interface could also be designed to manipulate navigation toward some
manifestation of consent to disclosure and use of information, for example
by leading the user to a dead end or on an infinite path,197 and the
placement of desired content or important information deep in a navigation
hierarchy.198 If assent to a contract or consent to collect and use personal
information is obtained through manipulated navigation, to what degree is
that consent voluntary?
Confusion, defined as “[a]sking the user questions or providing
information that they do not understand,”199 could similarly frustrate
contract formation.200 Confusion tactics can include use of multiple
negatives,201 such as “we promise never to refrain from ever disclosing
your information.”
Restricted functionality, defined as “[l]imiting or omitting controls that
the user needs to accomplish a task,”202 could also serve to invalidate assent
to an agreement.203 For example, while not allowing a user to proceed
194. Id.
195. CONTI & SOBIESK, supra note 185, at 272. A full explication of this taxonomy’s
application to contract law is outside the scope of this Article, but will be addressed in
future research.
196. Id. at 273.
197. See id. (listing as a representative instance “[a]sking a (near infinite) number of
questions to get a ‘free’ iPod”).
198. See id. (listing as a representative instance “[m]aking the free version of an
application far more difficult to find than the commercial version on a consumer firewall
vendor’s website”).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. (separating “Restricting Functionality” into two smaller categories—”Omit
necessary controls” and “Hide desired interface elements”). Conti and Sobiesk provide as
representative instances “[r]emoval of 30 second skip button on TiVo remote control, lack
of video download option at a video sharing site, pre-checked mailing list selections (but no
‘unselect all’ option),” and placing the print button at an obscure location on a webpage to
increase ad viewing times. Id.
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using a website without agreeing to the proposed terms would not be
malicious—and under current doctrine would serve to form a valid
agreement—certain features such as forcing a user to accept an agreement
or lose certain pieces of information could invalidate consent.204
Interfaces that obscure information or manipulate navigation have
already been considered significant, or even dispositive, by some courts in
analyzing electronic agreements.205 In one of the most prominent
browsewrap cases, Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.,206 the
Second Circuit refused to enforce terms of use where “[t]he sole reference
to [the terms] was located in text that would have become visible to
plaintiffs only if they had scrolled down to the next screen.”207 Thus, if
links to terms of use are buried at the bottom of a website or anywhere
where they are unlikely to be seen, courts have refused to find notice of
terms sufficient to form a contract.208 The Specht decision was an excellent
example of judicial recognition of a malicious interface, but it should be
seen as only the beginning of the exploration regarding how website design
can affect contract formation.
Yet these are not the only types of malicious interfaces that can
invalidate notice of terms.
Interfaces employing distraction and
interruption techniques could also serve to invalidate the notice required for
contract formation. Distracting video, animation, blinking, color, and
motion could attract the user’s attention away from inconspicuously
presented terms by exploiting perception, particularly pre-attentive
processing.209 Overly large “hot” regions for ads and other rollover design
204. Id.
205. See In re Easysaver Rewards Litig., 737 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1172 (S.D. Cal. 2010)
(accepting at the pleading stage of litigation as plausible that the plaintiffs “were deceived
into authorizing separate charges to their debit cards simply by typing in their e-mail address
for a complimentary gift”); Nordberg v. Trilegiant Corp., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088, 1098
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (finding that the plaintiffs adequately pled claims against a rewards
program where consumers claimed they had been automatically enrolled in a membership
program through a pop-up advertisement, without their consent, that charged fees unless the
consumer affirmatively canceled the program).
206. 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
207. Id. at 23.
208. See, e.g., Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(holding that the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the terms of service because the website did
not prompt her to scroll down to read them), aff’d, 380 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2010); Druyan
v. Jagger, 508 F. Supp. 2d 228, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (enforcing terms of service when such
terms were clearly conspicuous); Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive Intelligence, Inc.,
425 F. Supp. 2d 756, 787 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (taking into account the license agreements were
neither long nor buried).
209. CONTI & SOBIESK, supra note 185, at 273; see also Complaint at 15, FTC v. Pereira
(E.D. Va. June 20, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/9923264/
990922comp9923264.shtm (alleging an unfair and deceptive trade practice by the
defendant, which allegedly “uses technical tricks and thievery to drive consumers to
defendant WTFRC’s sexually-explicit, adult-oriented Web sites,” which the consumer then
has difficulty leaving because WFTRC manipulated functions of Internet browsers).
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elements could interrupt the contract formation process or obstruct the
presented terms.
Malicious interfaces must be considered in context to determine their
significance. Much like the factors to be considered in a fair-use analysis,
the existence of a malicious interface should not automatically invalidate a
contract. Rather, it should be balanced with other evidence of contract
formation. Clear, non-malicious interfaces should be entitled to a
rebuttable presumption of valid consent in light of an otherwise clear
manifestation. However, the presence of a number of malicious interfaces
(or a single significantly malicious interface) should receive a strong
presumption of invalidity with regard to the disputed or operative element
enabled through the interface.
C. Design as Evidence of Subsequent Agreement
When online agreements are offered as evidence in non-contractual
privacy disputes, courts should avoid treating the text of terms of use as
dispositive.210 Instead courts should consider the terms in conjunction with
other evidence, such as whether the contract was enforceable and whether
other representations were made to the user explicitly, implicitly, or by
virtue of their relationship.211 These additional considerations could
provide a better picture of what one court has dubbed the “operational
reality” of the relationship between the user and the website.212
In Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co.,213 city police department
employees brought a number of claims, including a Fourth Amendment
violation, against the city in connection with the department’s review of
employees’ text messages.214 Although the employees signed a general
“Computer Usage, Internet and E-mail Policy,” which provided that
“[u]sers should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when
using these resources,” the Ninth Circuit found that the “operational
210. Cf. United States v. Hart, No. 08-109-C, 2009 WL 2552347, at *25 (W.D. Ky. Aug.
17, 2009) (finding that because the defendant consented to the terms of use, “it is difficult to
conclude that [the defendant] had an actual expectation of privacy in the contents of any
communications sent or received with his Yahoo! accounts”).
211. James Grimmelmann has asserted that “when users make privacy choices using
Facebook’s technical controls, they’re expressing expectations about who will and won’t see
their information, and society should treat those expectations as reasonable for Fourth
Amendment purposes.” James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137,
1197 (2009).
212. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 907 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding
that the operational realities of a police department’s privacy policy gave police officers a
reasonable expectation of privacy even though the written department policy specifically
negated any expectation of privacy), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. City of Ontario v.
Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
213. 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct.
2619 (2010).
214. Id. at 898.

HARTZOG.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

WEBSITE DESIGN AS CONTRACT

8/10/2011 3:04 PM

1669

reality” at the department regarding privacy in electronic messages
reflected a different intent on the part of the police department.215 The
employees’ superiors made it clear they would not audit messages so long
as any additional costs for overage were paid for by the employees.216 The
court found the employees’ reliance on this “informal policy” was
reasonable, and as a result, the employees “had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the text messages archived in Arch Wireless’ server.”217
Courts should adopt the strategy employed by the Ninth Circuit in Quon
when analyzing evidence of contracts in privacy disputes. By considering
contextual factors such as informal policies or other representations made
by websites, courts avoid an unjust application of contract law in situations
where individuals reasonably relied on representations outside of the terms
of use. Although the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in Quon,218 the justices did not significantly address the “operational
reality” approach taken by the Ninth Circuit. Professor Solove has
suggested guidelines for courts when confronted with an agreement that
could govern privacy expectations:
(1) If the official policy clearly covers the practice at issue, and is
specific in referencing it, then there should be a strong presumption it
should govern. This presumption can be overridden only when there is a
consistent policy to the contrary demonstrated by clear and convincing
evidence based on the employer’s statements and practices. (2) If the
official policy is general in nature, and doesn’t specifically reference the
practice at issue, then there should be a weak presumption it should
govern.
This presumption can be overridden when there is a
preponderance of evidence demonstrating a different policy with regard
to the practice at issue.219

These guidelines could inform courts when determining the evidentiary
value of online agreements in privacy-related disputes. If, in the course of
an ongoing relationship with a website, representations regarding
confidentiality and a user’s control over the flow of information are made
clear to the user, a user should be able to reasonably rely on them. 220
215. Id. at 896.
216. Id. at 907.
217. Id.
218. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2624 (2010); see also CX Digital Media,
Inc. v. Smoking Everywhere, Inc., No. 09-62020-CIV, 2011 WL 1102782, at *11–12 (S.D.
Fla. Mar. 23, 2011) (finding that an instant message exchange effectively modified a written
agreement which contained a “no-oral modification clause”).
219. Daniel Solove, Thoughts on City of Ontario v. Quon: The Fourth Amendment and
Privacy of Electronic Communications in the Workplace, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Apr. 15,
2010, 12:04 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/04/thoughts-on-cityof-ontario-v-quon-the-fourth-amendment-and-privacy-of-electronic-communications.html.
220. This reliance justification is similar to a promissory estoppel argument and is
related to the code-based promises proposal above. Users might only disclose information if
websites promise to respect a user’s privacy preferences. See Hartzog, supra note 73, at
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Some courts weighing the evidentiary value of online agreements have
looked to user attempts to indicate privacy preferences. Although the court
in United States v. Hart found the terms of use dispositive regarding a
reasonable expectation of privacy, it noted that “the evidence in the record
does not show that the defendant sought to preserve as private that which
the plaintiff now seeks to introduce into evidence.”221 By considering text,
design, and action together, courts will be able to gain a better
understanding of whether expectations of privacy are “reasonable” and
alleviate some of the potentially unjust results from application of the illfitting standard-form contract theory to privacy disputes.
CONCLUSION
Privacy has become central to the user experience on many websites.
Users regularly adjust privacy settings, un-tag photos, and delete
information on their profile page. Privacy is also a significant aspect of the
terms of use and privacy policies present on nearly every website. These
consistently vague terms often reference the website’s interactive features
allowing users to protect their privacy. Yet courts customarily look only to
the fine print to determine the scope of the agreement between users and
websites regarding privacy. The contractual relationship formed when
users interact with a website is far more complicated. Website design and
features are capable of conveying a promise of privacy and inducing user
reliance. The fine print in terms of use agreements and privacy policies
often incorporates user privacy and website design. When website design
is part of, or consistent with, the terms of use and central to the user
experience, courts should look beyond boilerplate terms to find additional
promises, acceptances of offers, and even elements that can interfere with
contract formation.
Often, websites give the impression that website features, like the ability
to increase privacy settings, are offers to protect information. Websites
often promise to respect a user’s privacy choices and in the same paragraph
reference their privacy settings. In those contexts, courts should consider
user preferences for privacy as acceptances of offers of confidentiality.
Courts should also more thoroughly scrutinize the ways in which website
design can frustrate true agreement between the parties. Specifically,
courts should refuse to enforce agreements where websites have
egregiously employed malicious interfaces in the contract formation
process. Courts should extend the concept of procedural unconscionability

924.
221. United States v. Hart, No. 08-109-C, 2009 WL 2552347, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 17,
2009) (citation omitted).
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beyond the terms of use and consider the presence of malicious interfaces
in website features on the agreement regarding user privacy. Features such
as misleading links, disabled back buttons, unnecessary and confusing
forms, and pop-ups covering desired content could all frustrate contract
formation.
Finally, in non-contractual disputes where terms are merely evidence of
consent, courts should look beyond the fine print to discover the
operational reality between the parties. Here, courts should consider the
relationship between the parties, other representations made by the website,
and the context in which information was disclosed. For example, courts
could consider whether information was deleted before a privacy harm
occurred, whether privacy settings were utilized, or whether there were any
other operational realities outside of the terms of use that induced reliance
on a promise of confidentiality.
Online agreements are a promising solution to protect the flow of
personal information only if courts look beyond the language included in
standard-form contracts. Greater recognition of website design as a
contract would advance both contract and privacy doctrine by better
reflecting perceived promises of privacy and what information individuals
desire to keep confidential. Empowering users with simple and precise
ways to contractually protect their personal information could make the
overwhelming number of online agreements part of a trusted system of
Internet communication.

